

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00288 01 OF 02 151753Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 082717

P R 151530Z AUG 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2710

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0288

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15, 1975

(SALT TWO - 729)

THE FOLLOWING I STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 15, 1975. FOLLOWING THE
STATEMENT IS A PAPER WHICH WAS READ TO AND THEN HANDED BY
AMBASSADOR JOHNSON TO DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV DURING THE
PRIVATE MEETING.

QUOTE:

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

AUGUST 15, 1975

MR. MINISTER,

I

AT OUR LAST SESSION I DISCUSSED SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF ARTICLE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00288 01 OF 02 151753Z

XVIII OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. TODAY I WANT FURTHER TO DISCUSS

SUBPARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THAT ARTICLE. THE US FORMULATION FOR SUBPARAGRAPH 2(B) OF ARTICLE XVIII OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT PROVIDES THAT THE PARTIES, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, WILL "AGREE UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND CONVERSION WITH NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIONS BEING GIVEN TWICE ANNUALLY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN CASES PROVIDED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. SUCH NOTIFICATION SHALL INCLUDE ACTIONS COMPLETED IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, CURRENTLY UNDERWAY, AND TO BE TAKEN OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS." I NOTE THAT THE SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PART OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH; THAT IS, THE PORTION DEALING WITH PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DISMANTLING OR DISTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

II

THERE IS PRECEDENT BOTH FOR AGREEING TO ESTABLISH AND ALSO FOR ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES AS TO WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRTERIA VARIOUS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL BECOME SUBJECT TO AND CEASE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT. IN AN AGREED INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE SIDES AGREED TO ACCOMPLISH DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF CERTAIN ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS UNDER PROCEDURES TO BE AGREED IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. ACCORDINGLY, IN THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DISTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DATED JULY 3, 1974, THE PARTIES AGREED BOTH ON CRITERIA FOR WHAT CONSTITUTES DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND ALSO ON CRITERIA AS TO DATES, THAT IS, WHEN REPLACE-
MENT SLBM LAUNCHERS BECOME SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT THERE WILL BE A NEED TO AGREE ON SIMILAR PROCEDURES FOR THE VARIOUS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED.

THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL ESTABLISH CERTAIN AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS. WHEN A SIDE IS AT OR NEAR THE LEVEL OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SYSTEMS PERMITTED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE PROCEDURES FOR REPLACING AN OLD SYSTEM WITH A NEWER SYSTEM; THAT IS, SUBSTITUTING ONE WEAPONS SYSTEM FOR ANOTHER, EITHER OF THE SAME OR DIFFERENT CATEGORY. WITHOUT SUCH PROCEDURES IN VIEW OF THE LONG
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00288 01 OF 02 151753Z

LEAD TIMES INVOLVED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THE VARIOUS TIMES REQUIRED FOR DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF THESE SYSTEMS, A SIDE WOULD BE FACED WITH A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD AN OLD SYSTEM NEED TO BE COMPLETELY DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED BEFORE A REPLACEMENT SYSTEM COULD ENTER THE INVENTORY? OR, COULD DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD SYSTEM PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE FINAL STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM? THE FIRST

POSSIBILITY WOULD CONSTITUTE UNDUE INTERFERENCE WITH THE SIDE'S FREEDOM OF ACTION. IN THE ABSENCE OF PROCEDURES THE LATTER POSSIBILITY COULD LEAD TO AMBIGUITIES CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION. THESE AMBIGUITIES COULD BE AVOIDED IF, IN ADDITION TO DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES WHICH DETERMINE THE CRITERIA ACCORDING TO WHICH A SYSTEM IS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, THERE WERE AGREED PROCEDURES WHICH ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE POINT IN TIME AT WHICH A NEW SYSTEM WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THESE TWO ACTIVITIES MUST BE RELATED TO EACH OTHER, ESPECIALLY AS THE LIMITS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE REACHED OR APPROACHED. THUS, IN ADDITION TO DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES, PROCEDURES WILL BE NEEDED REGARDING REPLACEMENT OF AN OLDER SYSTEM WITH A NEW ONE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00288 02 OF 02 151814Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 082920

P R 151530Z AUG 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2711

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0288

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

MR. MINISTER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR SUCH REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES WHEN A SIDE IS AT OR NEAR THE 2400 AGGREGATE LIMITATION. AN ANALOGOUS SITUATION WILL EXIST WHEN A SIDE IS AT OR NEAR THE 1320 MIRV LIMITATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF UNDER THE LATTER CIRCUMSTANCE, A SIDE WISHES TO CONVERT NON-MIRVD LAUNCHERS TO MIRVD LAUNCHERS, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DISMANTLE

OR DESTROY EXISTING MIRVD LAUNCHERS OR TO CONVERT EXISTING MIRVD LAUNCHERS TO NON-MIRVD LAUNCHERS. THEREFORE, UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR AGREED PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR CONVERSION, THAT IS, FOR WHEN A STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEM IS CHANGED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE IT SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL, FEWER, OR DIFFERENT LIMITATIONS.

THE PROCEDURES AND DATES I HAVE DISCUSSED ARE NOT INTENDED TO LIMIT A SIDE'S FREEDOM OF ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HOW, AT WHAT RATE, OR ON WHAT CALENDAR DATES REPLACEMENT AND CONVERSION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT. RATHER, IT IS INTENDED THAT THE SIDES AGREE UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES -- THAT IS, RECOGNIZABLE MILESTONES IN REPLACEMENT OR CONVERSION PROGRAMS -- WHICH WOULD REGISTER THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES AS TO WHEN AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00288 02 OF 02 151814Z

UNDER WHAT CRITERIA A SYSTEM WOULD BE SUBJECT TO OR REMOVED FROM THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THEREFORE IT IS THE US VIEW THAT PROCEDURES FOR REPLACEMENT, CONVERSION, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ANY STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE NECESSARY.

IT IS ALSO THE US VIEW THAT IN RELATIONSHIP TO THESE PROCEDURES EACH SIDE SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATION TO THE OTHER SIDE OF ACTIONS COMPLETED, UNDERWAY AND TO BE TAKEN TO REPLACE, CONVERT OR DISMANTLE OR DESTROY ANY OF ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. SUCH NOTIFICATION COULD BE MADE AT REGULAR SESSIONS OF THE SCC. PROVIDING NOTIFICATION WOULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. FURTHER, IT WOULD NEITHER INTERFERE WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THEIR FORCES WITHIN THE 2400 AND 1320 AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS, NOR WOULD IT INTERFERE WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES TO MODERNIZE AND REPLACE THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

III

MR. MINISTER, THE PROVISIONS WHICH I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED, ALONG WITH THE PROVISION FOR EXCHANGE OF PERTINENT INFORMATION WHICH I DISCUSSED AT OUR LAST MEETING, CAN IN OUR VIEW ENHANCE THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

EXPLANATION OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVII

AT OUR MEETING OF AUGUST 12 YOU INQUIRED AS TO THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE FOLLOWING PHRASE FROM THE AGREED STATEMENT WHICH IS PART OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 8 FOR PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVII: "OR OTHERWISE HINDER THE COLLECTION OF ANY DATA, INCLUDING TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA, REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS."

THE AGREED STATEMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY READS:

"THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT THE WORDS 'ANY MEASURE OR PRACTICE WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDES VERIFICATION' IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVII INCLUDE ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS CARRIED OUT DELIBERATELY TO HINDE OR DISGUISE ANY DATA, OR OTHERWISE HINDER THE COLLECTION OF ANY DATA, INCLUDING TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA, WHICH ARE REQUIRED FOR SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00288 02 OF 02 151814Z

VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT."

FIRST, THE PHRASE ABOUT WHICH YOU INQUIRED REFERS TO "ANY DATA." IN MY STATEMENT OF JULY 25, I REVIEWED VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ARMS DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT, INCLUDING THE STAGES THROUGH WHICH A SIDE'S ARMS PASS DURING THEIR EXISTENCE. IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE OTHER SIDE, THROUGH ITS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, TO COLLECT AND TO ANALYZE DATA DURING THESE VARIOUS STAGES. ACCORDINGLY, THE AGREED STATEMENT REFERS TO "....(UNDERLINE) ANY (END UNDER-LINE) DATA.... REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS...."

NEXT, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PHRASE "INCLUDING TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA" APPLIES TO THE WORD "DATA" BOTH IN THE PHRASE "HINDER OR DISGUISE ANY DATA" AND IN THE PHRASE "OTHERWISE HINDER THE COLLECTION OF ANY DATA." "TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA" ARE MENTIONED TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT THE GATHERING BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA SHALL NOT BE DELIBERATELY IMPEDED BY EITHER SIDE WHEN SUCH DATA ARE REQUIRED TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. EXPLICIT AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT IS REQUIRED IN VIEW OF THE BROADER SCOPE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING THE MIRV LIMITATION, OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE AGREED STATEMENT MENTIONS TWO SPECIFIC WAYS OF HINDERING THE COLLECTION OF DATA, NAMELY, HIDING DATA AND DISGUIISING DATA. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT NOT FALL IN THE CATEGORIES OF HIDING AND DISGUIISING BUT WHICH WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION. THESE ACTIVITIES ARE COVERED BY THE PHRASE "OR OTHERWISE HINDERS." THE AGREED STATEMENT AS A WHOLE, THEREFORE, MEANS THAT ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS CARRIED OUT DELIBERATELY TO SERVE AS AN OBSTACLE TO, OR TO MAKE MORE DIFFICULT, THE COLLECTION OF DATA REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION WOULD BE PROHIBITED. NO ATTEMPT IS MADE IN THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ENUMERATE ALL SUCH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES.
UNQUOTE JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENT DRAFT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00288
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750283-0204
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750848/aaaabqcu.tel
Line Count: 273
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 JUN 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <15 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15, 1975 (SALT TWO - 729)
TAGS: PARM, (JOHNSON, U ALEXIS)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006